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TESTILYING: POLICE PERJURY AND
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN*

O.J. Simpson's trial for the murders of Nicole Brown Simpson
and Ronald Goldman provided the nation with at least two
pristine examples of police perjury. First, there was the exposure
of Detective Marc Fuhrman as a har. While under oath at trial
the detective firmly asserted, in response to F. Lee Bailey's
questions, that he had not used the word "nigger" in the past
decade. The McKinny tapes and assorted other witnesses made
clear this statement was an untruth. That proof of perjury,
together with the defense's innuendo that Fuhrman had planted
a glove smeared with Nicole's blood on Simpson's property,
severely damaged the prosecution's case.'
Second, and less well known, is Judge Lance Ito's finding that
Detective Philip Vannatter had demonstrated a "reckless
disregard for the truth" in the warrant application for the search
of Simpson's house. Among other misrepresentations,2 Vannatter
insinuated that Simpson had suddenly taken flight to Chicago
when in fact police knew the trip had been planned for months,
and unequivocally asserted that the substance found on Simpson's Bronco was blood when in fact it had not yet been tested.'
A third possible series of perjurious incidents occurred at the
suppression hearing, when both Fuhrman and Vannatter stated
that police investigating Simpson's compound had not considered
O.J. a suspect, but rather had entered the premises solely out of
concern for the athlete's welfare (and therefore had not needed
probable cause or a warrant). Although both Judge Ito and

* Professor of Law & Alumni Research Scholar, University of Florida College
of Law.
1. For one account of this series of events, see Jeffrey Toobin, A HorribleHuman
Event, NEW YORKER, Oct. 23, 1995, at 40, 41-42.

2. Vannatter also neglected to mention that much of the basis for his assertion
that there was probable cause came from a warrantless entry of O.J.'s compound, the
legality of which had not yet been litigated. See infra text accompanying notes 4-5.
3. For a description of these misrepresentations and how Judge Ito reacted to
them, see Wayne R. LaFave, O.J. Simpson Case Commentaries: Challenging
Probable Cause for Search Warrants, 1994 WL 530235, Sept. 30, 1994, available in

WESTLAW, O.J.-Comment database (on file with the University of Colorado Law
Review).
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Magistrate Kathleen Kennedy-Powell accepted these assertions,4
most who have considered the matter believe otherwise,' on the
common sense ground that police who knew that O.J. had beaten
Nicole on past occasions, found what appeared to be blood on his
car, and were unable to locate him after the murders would zero
in on him as a possible culprit.
If one believes the defense theory of the case, Fuhrman's and
Vannatter's deceitful exploits were a racist attempt to send an
innocent person to jail,' as well as a form of protective lying,
meant to prevent discovery of their own criminal activity in
planting evidence. If one believes the prosecution's theory, these
lies were merely a well-intentioned effort, albeit an improper one,
to ensure conviction of a guilty person. On the latter theory,
Fuhrman's denials at trial were meant to avoid a topic that would
only have distracted the jury from the "real" issue. Similarly,
Vannatter's lies in the warrant application and Fuhrman's and
Vannatter's probable dissembling at the suppression hearing
were designed to cover up irregularities in the evidence gathering
process that, if discovered, might have lead to exclusion of crucial
incriminating information.
We may never know with certainty the reason for the perjury
in the Simpson case. But we do know that, whatever the motivation, the perjury was wrong. If the lying occurred to frame an
innocent person, it was clearly corrupt. If instead it was meant
to facilitate conviction of a person the police witnesses thought to
be guilty, it was also reprehensible. Although, as we shall see,
many police and even some attorneys and judges seem to think
otherwise, lying to convict a guilty person is wrong for several
reasons. It is wrong because it involves lying under oath to
judicial officers and jurors. It is wrong because it keeps from
those fact finders information relevant to constitutional and other

4. Kenneth B. Noble, RulingAids Prosecutionof Simpson, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20,
1994, at A16.

5. See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, O.J. Simpson Case Commentaries: Over the Wall:
A New Theory RegardingEntry of the Simpson Compound, 1994 WL 562135, at 1,

Oct. 15, 1994, available in WESTLAW, O.J.-Comment database (on file with the
University of ColoradoLaw Review) ("The LaFave poll (admittedly unscientific and
consisting of nothing more than the random reactions of friends, colleagues and
students with whom I have discussed the Simpson case) indicates that most people
have responded to [these claims] with a fair degree of incredulity.").
6. See Toobin, supra note 1, at 41-42.
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issues. And it is wrong because the police cannot be counted upon
to get guilt right.
Perhaps most importantly, police lying intended to convict
someone, whether thought to be guilty or innocent, is wrong
because once it is discovered, it diminishes one of our most crucial
"social goods"-trust in government. 7 First, of course, the
exposure of police perjury damages the credibility of police
testimony. As the aftermath of the Fuhrman debacle has shown,
the revelation that some police routinely and casually lie under
oath makes members of the public, including those who serve on
juries, less willing to believe all police, truthful or not. One
comment that a New York prosecutor made about the impact of
the Simpson case illustrates the point: "Our prosecutors now
have to begin their cases defending the cops. Prosecutors have to
bring the jury around to the opinion that cops aren't lying. That's
how much the landscape has changed."'
Police perjury can cause other systemic damage as well.
Presumably, for instance, the loss of police credibility on the
stand diminishes law enforcement's effectiveness in the streets.
Most significantly, to the extent other actors, such as prosecutors
and judges, are perceived to be ignoring or condoning police
perjury,9 the loss of public trust may extend beyond law enforcement to the criminal justice system generally.

7. The idea of trust as a social good is presented in SIssELA BOK, LYING: MORAL
CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 26-27 (1978) ("[Tlrust is a social good to be
protected just as much as the air we breathe or the water we drink. When it is
damaged, the community as a whole suffers; and when it is destroyed, societies falter
and collapse.").
8. Joe Sexton, Jurors Question Honesty of Police, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1995, at
B3 (quoting Michael F. Vecchione, Brooklyn District Attorney Charles J. Hynes's
deputy in charge of trials). Consider also these words:
[I]t has to be recognized that, while there is no reason to suppose that
policemen as individuals are any less fallible than other members of
society, people are often shocked and outraged when policemen are
exposed violating the law. The reason is simple. Their deviance elicits a
special feeling of betrayal. In a sense, they are doubly condemned; that
is, not just for the infringement itself but even more for the breach of trust
involved. Something extra is involved when public officials in general and
policemen in particular deviate from accepted norms: 'That something
more is the violation of a fiduciary relationship,the corruption of a public
trust, of public virtue."
MAURICE PUNCH, CONDUCT UNBECOMING 8 (1985) (quoting Albert J. Reiss, Jr.,
Forewordto THE LITERATURE OF POLICE CORRUPTION ix-x (Anthony E. Simpson ed.,
1977)).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 35-52.
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Although both lying to convict the innocent and lying to
convict the guilty thus deserve condemnation, this article will
focus on the latter because it is the more resistant to change and
the more prevalent (two traits that are not unrelated). Lying to
convict the innocent is undoubtedly rejected by most police, as
well as by others, as immoral and unjustifiable. In contrast, lying
intended to convict the guilty-in particular, lying to evade the
consequences of the exclusionary rulel°-is so common and so
accepted in some jurisdictions that the 1police themselves have
come up with'a name for it: "testilying."'
Part I of this article describes the nature and causes of
testilying in more detail. Part II then examines several proposals
for curtailing it, ranging from expansion of the warrant requirement to the use of polygraph examinations at suppression
hearings. All of these proposals are found at least partially
wanting, if for no other reason than that they are aimed at
suppressing lying by the police, rather than at reducing the
pressure that causes it. Part III thus advances another proposal,
or actually a trio of proposals. Specifically, it suggests that
redefining probable cause in a more flexible manner and replacing the exclusionary rule with a damages remedy, together with
clear rewards and punishments connected with lying, would
significantly decrease testilying by diminishing the urge both to
lie and to cover it up. While these proposals may be viewed as
drastic medicine, they are defensible in their own right, and at
the same time may go a long way toward shoring up the trust in
the police and other government officials that is essential to a
well-functioning law enforcement and criminal justice system.

10. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (requiring exclusion of evidence
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966) (requiring exclusion of evidence seized in violation of the Miranda
warnings requirement).
11. COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE
ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEP'T, CITY OF NEW YORK, COMMISSION

REPORT 36 (1994) (Milton Mollen, Chair) [hereinafter MOLLEN REPORT] ("Several
officers also told us that the practice of police falsification in connection with such
arrests is so common in certain precincts that it has spawned its own word:
'testilying.' ").
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THE NATURE OF TESTILYING

Whether it is conjecture by individual observers, 2 a survey
of criminal attorneys," or a more sophisticated study, 4 the
existing literature demonstrates a widespread belief that
testilying is a frequent occurrence. Of course, there is Alan
Dershowitz's well-known assertion (made long before his participation in the O.J. Simpson case) that "almost all" officers lie to
convict the guilty. 5 Dershowitz may have been engaging in
hyperbole, but his claim is not as far off as one might think. In
one survey, defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges estimated
that police perjury at Fourth Amendment suppression hearings
occurs in twenty to fifty percent of the cases.' Jerome Skolnick,
a veteran observer of the police, has stated that police perjury of
this type is "systematic."'7 Even prosecutors--or at least former
12. Irving Younger, The Perjury Routine, THE NATION, May 8, 1967, at 596-97
("Every lawyer who practices in the criminal courts knows that police perjury is
commonplace."); see also David Wolchover, Police Perjury in London, 136 NEW L.J.
181, 183 (1986) (estimating that police officers lie in 3 out of 10 trials).
13. Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An
Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 107 (1992)
(survey of prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges indicates a belief that, on
average, perjury occurs 20% of the time, with defense attorneys estimating it occurs
53% of the time in connection with Fourth Amendment issues; only 8% believe that
police never, or almost never, lie in court); see also Fred Cohen, Police Perjury: An
Interview with Martin Garbus, 8 CRIM.L. BULL. 363, 367 (1972) ("[A]mong all the
lawyers that I know-whether they are into defense work or prosecution-not one of
them will argue that systematic police perjury does not exist. We may differ on its
extent, its impact... but no trial lawyer that I know will argue that police perjury
is nonexistent or sporadic."); N. G. Kittel, Police Perjury: CriminalDefense Attorneys'
Perspective, 11 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 11, 16 (1986) (57% of 277 attorneys believe police
perjury takes place very often or often).
14. See Sarah Barlow, Patternsof Arrests for Misdemeanor NarcoticsPossession:
ManhattanPolicePractices 1960-62, 4 CRIM. L. BULL. 549, 549-50 (1968) (presenting
data showing that "dropsy testimony"-i.e., police testimony that an arrestee had
dropped drugs as the police came upon them-increased after Mapp v. Ohio imposed
the exclusionary rule on state police, indicating that the "police are lying about the
circumstances of such arrests so that the contraband which they have seized illegally
will be admissible as evidence.").
15. ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE xxi-xxii (1983) ("Rule IV: Almost
all police lie about whether they violated the Constitution in order to convict guilty
defendants.").
16. Orfield, supra note 13, at 83 ("Respondents, including prosecutors, estimate
that police commit perjury between 20% and 50% of the time they testify on Fourth
Amendment issues."). It should also be noted that many of these respondents did not
consider lying at a suppression hearing perjury, infra text accompanying note 47,
which would have the effect of deflating these percentages.
17. Jerome H. Skolnick, Deception by Police, CRIM. JUST. ETHIcs, Summer/Fall
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prosecutors-use terms like "routine,"'8 "commonplace,"' 9 and
"prevalent"2 to describe the phenomenon. Few knowledgeable
persons are willing to say that police perjury about investigative
matters is sporadic or rare, except perhaps the police, and, as
noted above, 2' even many of them believe it is common enough to
merit a label all its own.2 2
Although testilying can occur at any stage of the criminal
process, including trial, it usually takes place during the investigative and pretrial stages, since it is most frequently an attempt
to cover up illicit evidence gathering. One of the best descriptions
of such perjury comes from the Mollen Commission, named after
Judge Milton Mollen, who led an investigation into corruption in
the New York City Police Department in the early 1990s:
Officers reported a litany of manufactured tales. For example,
when officers unlawfully stop and search a vehicle because
they believe it contains drugs or guns, officers will falsely claim
in police reports and under oath that the car ran a red light (or
committed some other traffic violation) and that they subsequently saw contraband in the car in plain view. To conceal an
unlawful search of an individual who officers believe is
carrying drugs or a gun, they will falsely assert that they saw
a bulge in the person's pocket or saw drugs and money changing hands. To justify unlawfully entering an apartment where
officers believe narcotics or cash can be found, they pretend to
have information from an unidentified civilian informant or
claim they saw the drugs in plain view after responding to the
premises on a radio run. To arrest people they suspect are
guilty of dealing drugs, they falsely assert that the defendants

1982, at 40, 42.
18. Scott Turow, Simpson ProsecutorsPay for their Blunders, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.

4, 1995, at A21 (Turow was a prosecutor for several years.).
19. Younger, supra note 12, at 596 (Younger was a prosecutor and a judge.).
20. H. RICHARD UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL: A COLUMBIA LAW PROFESSOR'S YEAR

ON THE STREETS WITH THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE 116 (1988) (Uviller was a
prosecutor for 14 years.).

21. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
22. See id.; see also ROBERT DALEY, THE PRINCE OF THE CITY 73 (1978)
(describing perjury that "detectives ... committed all the time in the interest of
putting bad people in jail"); Myron R. Orfield, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence:
An EmpiricalStudy of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 CHI. L. REv. 1016, at 1049-50

(1987) (Seventy-six percent of police surveyed believe police shade the facts regarding
probable cause, 56% believed perjury was infrequent and 19% believe it was
reasonably common.).
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had drugs in their possession when, in fact, the drugs were
found elsewhere where the officers had no lawful right to be.23
As this excerpt suggests, the most common venue for
testilying is the suppression hearing and the most frequent type
of suppression hearing perjury is post hoc fabrication of probable
cause." However, lying about events in the interrogation room
may be routine as well. Professor Richard Uviller's on-the-spot
observations of the police led him to conclude, for example, that
police may often "advance slightly the moment at which the
Miranda warnings were recited to satisfy the courts' insistence
that they precede the very first question in a course of interrogation.' 25
The Mollen Report excerpt also refers to testilying during the
warrant application process, which the Fourth Amendment
requires take place under oath. 2' Although estimating its
prevalence is difficult, police misrepresentation on the application
form and in oral testimony to the warrant magistrate has been
recounted by numerous observers.27 Most frequent, it seems, is
the invention of "confidential informants" (like the "unidentified
civilian informant" referred to in the excerpt), a ploy that allows
police to cover up irregularities in developing probable cause or
to assert they have probable cause when in fact all they have is
a hunch.28

23. MOLLEN REPORT, supra note 11, at 38.
24. See also JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 212-19 (2d ed. 1975).
25. UVILLER, supra note 20, at 116.
26. "[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
27. JONATHAN RUBINSTEIN, CITY POLICE 386-88 (1973) (describing the
preparation of false search warrants as routine, with supervisors often selecting the
officers most skilled in perjury as the ones to seek the warrant); see also Orfield,
supra note 13, at 102-08 (describing improper use of "boilerplate" language in
warrant applications). In Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807 (1994), the complaint
alleged that a detective repeatedly used an informant (on 50 occasions) despite the

fact that on each occasion her information turned out to be false and charges were
dismissed. Id. at 823 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
28. One of the more extreme examples (one hopes) is described in
Commonwealth v. Lewin, 542 N.E.2d 275 (Mass. 1989), in which the court concluded
that in all likelihood an informant named "John," who supplied the basis for 31
search warrants over a 10-month period, and for many others over a five-year period,
never existed. Id. at 284. Many have speculated that the "informer" involved in
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), did not exist. See, e.g., Joseph D.
Grano, A Dilemma for Defense Counsel: Spinelli-Harris Search Warrants and the
Possibilityof Police Perjury, 1971 LAW F. 405, 427, 456-57.
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Finally, police perjury also occurs in connection with the
fabrication of their reports. Although not technically testimony,
police know these reports may be dispositive in a case resolved
through plea bargaining, and can be compared to testimony in
cases that aren't. As a result, "reportilying" also appears to be
pervasive in some jurisdictions. The Mollen Commission, for
instance, described how narcotics police "falsify arrest papers to
make it appear as if an arrest that actually occurred inside a
-building [in violation of departmental regulations] took place on
the street."29 Professor Stanley Fisher has also documented
prolific use of the "double filing" system, in which the official
police file forwarded to the prosecution and provided to the
defense is cleansed of exculpatory facts or possible impeachment
evidence.3 °
The most obvious explanation for all of this lying is a desire
to see the guilty brought to "justice." As law enforcement officers,
the police do not want a person they know to be a criminal to
escape conviction simply because of a "technical" violation of the
Constitution, a procedural formality, or a trivial "exculpatory"
fact. As Skolnick puts it, the officer "lies because he is skeptical
of a system that suppresses truth in the interest of the
criminal."'" A related reason for police dissembling is the
institutional pressure to produce "results," which can lead police
to cut corners in an effort to secure convictions. 2 Peer practice
may also play a role. One reason Skolnick says police perjury is
"systematic" is that "police know that other police are perjuring
themselves."33

29. MOLLEN REPORT, supranote 11, at 38.
30. Stanley Z. Fisher, "Just the Facts, Ma'am" Lying and the Omission of
Exculpatory Evidence in Police Reports, 28 N. ENG. L. REV. 1, 36-38 (1993).

31. Skolnick, supra note 17, at 43. See also Carl B. Klockars, Blue Lies and
Police Placebos, 27 AMER. BEHAV. SCI. 529, 540 (1984) (Police lie at suppression

hearings because they see search-and-seizure rules, and other evidentiary rules, as
procedural rules "the violation of which does not affect a perpetrator's factual guilt.").
32. Indeed, significant evidence suggests that police supervisors, driven by the
same crime control and quota pressures that drive field officers, actively encourage
testilying. See MOLLEN REPORT, supra note 11, at 40-41 (describing how supervisors
train officers in how to commit perjury); ALLAN N. KORNBLUM, THE MORAL HAZARDs:
POLICE STRATEGIES FOR HONESTY AND ETHICAL BEHAVIOR 80 (1976) (describing New

York City police practice of "flaking," or planting evidence on suspects to meet "norms
of production").
33. Skolnick, supra note 17, at 42.
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These motivations are probably not the whole explanation,
however. The police officer who lies to convict a criminal is
generally lying under oath in a public legal forum. 4 Thus, the
lying officer is exposed to criminal charges in a proceeding
involving a legally trained adversary and open to-indeed,
usually directed against-those who can prove the perjury.
That perjury persists despite these risks can be explained by
one simple factor: police think they can get away with it. Police
are seldom made to pay for their lying. To some extent, this
immunity may be due to their own expertise at deceit. Many
prosecutors and judges believe perjury is systematic and often
suspect it is occurring in individual cases. But they also frequently claim that they are not sure enough to do anything about
it;35 after all, the typical situation pits a police officer, well trained
on how to "constitutionalize" a case, against a person charged
with a crime, who is decidedly less aware of the relevant law.
However, many observers believe that perjury is frequently
apparent, and that, even so, prosecutors and judges rarely take
action against it.36 The Simpson trial is a case in point. As Alan
Dershowitz stated:

0

34. Although police reports are not testimony, in some jurisdictions they are
written under oath. In others, falsification of a report can result in statutory
penalties. See Fisher, supra note 30, at 9 n.36.
35. See UVILLER, supra note 20, at 111 (asserting that perjury "is extremely

elusive, almost impossible to identify with certainty in a particular instance"); Fisher,
supra note 30, at 10 n.40 (stating that Uviller's experience mirrors his own).
36. See Alan M. Dershowitz, Controllingthe Cops; Accomplices to Perjury,N.Y.
TIMES, May 2, 1994, at A17 (I have seen trial judges pretend to believe officers whose

testimony is contradicted by common sense, documentary evidence and even
unambiguous tape recordings.... Some judges refuse to close their eyes to perjury,
but they are the rare exception to the rule of blindness, deafness and muteness that
guides the vast majority of judges and prosecutors."); Nat Hentoff, When Police
Commit Perjury, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 1985, at A21 (describing the view of Michael

Avery that prosecutors and judges do nothing about obvious police perjury); David
Rudovsky, Why It Was Hands Off on the Police, PHILA. INQ., Aug. 28, 1995, at A7
(describing instances in which prosecutors and judges ignored "hard evidence" of false

warrant applications, false police reports, and perjury in a series of Philadelphia
cases); Marty I. Rosenbaum, Inevitable Error: Wrongful New York State Homicide

Convictions, 1965-1988, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 807, 809 (1990-91) ("[A]
substantial number of the wrongful convictions . . . resulted from prosecutorial
misconduct... includ[ing] ... the conscious use of perjured testimony."); Younger,
supra note 12, at 596 ("[T]he policeman is as likely to be indicted for perjury by his

co-worker, the prosecutor, as he is to be struck down by thunderbolts from an
avenging heaven.").
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[The prosecutors knew that Fuhrman was a racist, a perjurer,
and an evidence planter before they put him on the stand. An
assistant district attorney, among others, warned the Simpson
prosecutors about Fuhrman. The prosecutors also saw his
psychological reports, in which he admitted his racist attitudes
and actions. The only thing they didn't know is that Fuhrman-and they-would be caught by the tapes.3 7
While Dershowitz's take on the issue might be tainted by his
involvement in the case, the view of Scott Turow, a former
prosecutor, is not. As he stated in a New York Times op-ed piece
about the prosecution's use of Fuhrman and Vannatter, "[t]he fact
that the district attorney's office put these officers on the witness
stand to tell [their] story and that the municipal judge at the
pretrial hearing, Kathleen Kennedy-Powell, accepted it is
scandalous. It is also routine." 8
Probably the most stunning evidence of prosecutorial and
judicial nonchalance toward police perjury is Myron Orfield's
study of the Chicago system." His study is stunning because,
unlike many of the comments on this issue,4 ° Orfield's findings
are based on the views of prosecutors and judges as well as those
of defense attorneys. In his survey of these three groups (which
together comprised twenty-seven to forty-one individuals,
depending on the question), 52% believed that at least "half of the
time" the prosecutor "knows or has reason to know" that police
fabricate evidence at suppression hearings, and 93%, including
89% of the prosecutors, stated that prosecutors had such knowledge of perjury "at least some of the time."4 1 Sixty-one percent,
including 50% of the state's attorneys, believed that prosecutors
know or have reason to know that police fabricate evidence in
case reports, and 50% of the prosecutors believed the same with
respect to warrants (despite the fact that many prosecutors
refused to talk about this latter area).42 While close to half of all
respondents believed that prosecutors "discourage" such perjury
and fabrication,43 a greater percentage believed that they "toler-

37. Alan Dershowitz, PolicePerjury Destroyed the Simpson Prosecution,BUFF.
NEWS,

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Oct. 7, 1995, at 3B.
Turow, supra note 18, at A21.
Orfield, supra note 13.
The first three observers cited in supra note 36 are defense attorneys.
Orfield, supra note 13, at 109.
Id. at 110.
Id. at 112.
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ate" it," and 15% believed that prosecutors actually "encourage"
it.4" One former prosecutor described what he called a "commonly
used" technique of steering police testimony by telling officers "[i]f
this happens, we win. If this happens, we lose."4 6 Most amazingly, 29% of the respondents did not equate lying at a suppression hearing with the crime of perjury.4" Although the respondents' views on judicial, as opposed to prosecutorial, attitudes
toward testilying were not as directly plumbed in this survey,
when asked whether Chicago's criminal justice system effectively
controls policy perjury at 48suppression hearings, 69% of the
respondents answered "no."
Prosecutors put up with perjury because they need a good49
working relationship with the police to make their cases.
Additionally, at bottom, they probably agree with the police that
the end justifies the means.5" Judicial acquiescence to perjury
can be explained to some extent by prosecutorial failure to make
the case for it. But defense attorney arguments and the judge's
own observations can provide plenty of evidence of testilying in at
least some cases. To the extent judges ignore obvious perjury, it
is probably for the same reasons attributable to the prosecutor:
sympathy for the police officer's ultimate goal 5 ' and, as Professor

44. As one state's attorney stated: "We view our role as neutral. We don't try
to influence perjury one way or another." Id. at 111.
45. Id. at 110-11. In what seems to be a contradiction, Orfield reports that 61%
believed prosecutors tolerate perjury, while 48% believe prosecutors discourage it.
46. Id. at 110.
47. Id. at 112. Interestingly, of the 11 respondents who answered this way, two
were judges, three were state's attorneys, and six were public defenders. Id. at 112
n.172. Prosecutors explained their views in this regard by calling the perjury
"fudging" rather than lying, or by defining perjury as lying about guilt or innocence.
Id. at 112-13.
48. Id. at 114. In another part of the study, reported separately, Orfield found
that 86% of police officers surveyed believed it "unusual but not rare" for judges to
disbelieve police testimony. Orfield, supra note 22, at 1049.
49. Jay S. Silver, Truth, Justice,and the American Way: The Case Against the
Client Perjury Rules, 47 VAND. L. REV. 339, 358 n.75 (1994) ("The institutional
tendency to tolerate police perjury likely stems from the prosecutor's interest in
maintaining smooth working relations with police, who gather the government's
evidence and are often its most important witnesses at trial, and from the
prosecutor's own competitive drive to win and to advance professionally."); see also
sources cited supra note 36.
50. Orfield, supra note 13, at 113 ("Many prosecutors believe that 'real' perjury
only concerns questions of guilt or innocence, not questions of probable cause.").
51. Id. at 121 (finding that 70% of respondents believe that judges sometimes
fail to suppress evidence when the law requires suppression "because [the judge]
believes it is unjust to suppress the evidence given the circumstances of the case
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Morgan Cloud put it, "tact"--the fact that "[j]udges simply do not
like to call other government officials liars-especially those who
appear regularly in court. 52

II.

SOME PROPOSALS FOR REDUCING TESTILYING

Several obvious ways of minimizing testilying suggest
themselves. One such method is to sensitize the police, through
training, to the immorality and dangers of perjury. Along the
same lines, Skolnick has suggested that, as lawyers with the
same crime control orientation as the police, prosecutors might
have enough credibility to get across to the police the importance
of truth telling.5 3 Prosecutors can also be admonished to take
their ethical duty to promote justice seriously,5 4 including
providing the defense with information about perjury when it
comes to their attention.5 5
Less obvious solutions might involve changing the structure
of the police force itself. For instance, if community and problemsolving policing lived up to its promise, law enforcement might
consist more of prevention than apprehension.5 6 This shift in

before him").
52. Morgan Cloud, The Dirty Little Secret, 43 EMORY L.J. 1311, 1323-24 (1994).
53. SKOLNICK, supra note 24, at 203.
The prosecutor need not be successful in making the policeman approve
of the strictures of due process of law, which he typically does not admire
himself. By accepting their legitimacy, however, he demonstrates to the
policeman that it is at once possible to disagree with the rules of the game
as they are laid down, and at the same time to carry out the enforcement
of substantive criminal law ....
Id.
54. The American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct state
that the "prosecutor in a criminal case shall.., make timely disclosure to the defense
of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt
of the accused or mitigates the offense." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Rule 3.8(d) (1983). The ABA's Criminal Justice Standards on the Prosecution
Function provide, inter alia, that "[tihe duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not
merely to convict," STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-1.1 (2d ed. 1979); that the
prosecutor "has an affirmative responsibility to investigate suspected illegal activity
when it is not adequately dealt with by other agencies," id. § 3-3.1(a); that the
prosecutor must not "knowingly... use illegal means to obtain evidence or to employ
or instruct or encourage others to use such means," id. § 3-3.1(b); and that a
prosecutor shall not "intentionally ... avoid pursuit of evidence because he or she
believes it will damage the prosecution's case or aid the accused," id. § 3-3.11(c).
55. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 54, Rule 3.8(d).
56. See generally JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW:
POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE 237-66 (1993) (stating that problemoriented policing and community-oriented policing "stand in opposition to incident-
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emphasis might well lessen the need to testilie by reducing both
the pressure to produce "activity" in the form of questionable
stops and arrests, and the occasions when courtroom testimony
is required. Alternatively, we could try to reconstruct our police
forces on the European model. In theory at least, continental
police are less adversarial in nature and thus more likely to
report the facts simply as they occur. 7
Theoretically, these and other "internal" changes could have
a significant impact on testilying. However, institutional change
in the past has been frustratingly unsuccessful.5" In any event,
describing in more detail how and whether these proposals would
work is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I will focus
primarily on the extent to which changes in traditional constitutional doctrine-particularly that having to do with the Fourth
Amendment-can inhibit police lying. Here in Part II, I discuss
a number of proposals that have been advanced or alluded to by
others. In Part III, I will suggest a three-part proposal of my
own.
A.

Expansion of the Warrant Requirement

Professor Morgan Cloud has argued that perjury about
Fourth Amendment issues can be curbed by expanding the
warrant requirement to all nonexigent searches and seizures and
by simultaneously defining the exigency exception very
narrowly.5 9 This proposal may well reduce perjury to some
extent. Relative to a post-search suppression hearing, police at
a warrant proceeding will find the manufacture of probable cause
more difficult because they do not know what their search will
find and thus will not be able to fabricate "suspicions" as effectively.

driven policing," id. at 257).
57. See generally John H. Langbein & Lloyd L. Weinreb, Continental Criminal
Procedure: "Myth"andReality, 87 YALE L.J. 1549, 1552-54, 1562-63 & n.51 (German
and French police are trained as 'judicial officers" and required to report exculpatory
as well as inculpatory information.).
58. See generally Symposium, Police Corruption,Municipal Corruption: Cures
at What Cost?, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1 (1995). Several of the commentators in this
symposium issue remark on the fact that police corruption scandals erupt at 20-year
intervals despite institutional reform. See, e.g., id. at 6, 45, 55 (three authors, a
judge, an ex-police commissioner, and an administrator, making this point).
59. Cloud, supra note 52, at 1344-48.
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Nonetheless, a warrant requirement can be eviscerated in
several ways by police who have no qualms about lying. First,
whatever the validity of the pre- versus post-search lying
hypothesis, the fact remains that, as noted above, ° police have
quite frequently managed to lie successfully during the warrant
application process. Second, police are not above conducting a
surreptitious search before going to the magistrate to ensure their
story will later float when they swear out a warrant affidavit.6'
Third, and most important, police contemplating a search may
simply not bother to go to a magistrate, in the belief that they can
later cook up facts supporting a claim of exigency. Although,
despite its costs,62 I too have argued in favor of expanding the
warrant requirement, 3 this proposal by itself will probably
inhibit perjury only minimally.
B. Informant Production
A second proposal, designed specifically to stymie the practice
of inventing snitches, is to require the police to produce their
informants in front of the issuing magistrate. 4 Again, however,
police who have no scruples about lying can wink at this rule.
They can coach their informant, or even someone else acting as an
informant, to lie about the information necessary for probable
cause. They also might simply say the informant is unavailable,
in the face of which a magistrate may feel helpless. The cost of
the proposal would be longer warrant reviews, a curtailment of
the worthwhile telephonic warrant system (unless informants

60. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
61. See SKOLNICK, supranote 24, at 144 ('The practice of making an unlawful
exploratory search of the room of a suspected criminal is, so far as I could tell on
several occasions, accepted by both the Westville police and the state police.").
62. ' The vast majority of searches are conducted without a warrant ......
RICHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL., THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS,
PERCEPTIONS, PRACTICES 19 (1985). Any significant increase in that percentage could

burden judges, with a concomitant greater potential for rubber-stamping of
applications.
63. Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a FourthAmendment, 39 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 29-38 (1991).
64. Some courts have endorsed this approach. See, e.g., United States v.
Manley, 632 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1980); People v. Darden, 313 N.E.2d 49 (1974).
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could somehow be patched in),65 and the risk that informants'
identities will be exposed.
C. The Panch System
A third idea is to follow the lead of foreign countries like
France and India and require police conducting a house search to
be accompanied by lay citizens who observe its execution. 6
Theoretically, this procedure, called the panch system in India,
would provide a neutral source of information about the search of
the house. It could also be extended to other types of searches
and seizures, as well as to interrogations.
One wonders, in the Indian and French systems, where the
lay citizens come from (i.e., whether they are simply picked up off
the street or can be informants or other police minions), and how
often they actually testify in conflict with the police. Further,
citizen overview would presumably not be feasible in emergency
situations, which the police could manufacture. Nonetheless, the
idea is worth considering. In theory, at least, such a system
would confront lying officers with eyewitnesses who, unlike
defendants, are untainted by criminal charges.
D. Videotaping
If the pancha system has some merit, we could also institute
its technological equivalent and require that all police actions be
videotaped. This requirement would be relatively simple to
implement in the interrogation context. Indeed, several American jurisdictions have already demonstrated that fact. 8 Video

65. Telephonic warrants, which allow police to obtain a warrant while still on
the street in a fraction of the time normally required to obtain a warrant, VAN
DUIZEND ET AL., supra note 62, at 85-87, are a crucial aspect of most proposals for
expanding the warrant requirement. See also Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the
FourthAmendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1491-98 (1985); Cloud, supra note 52, at
1346; Slobogin, supra note 63, at 32.
66. For a description of the French procedure, see Richard S. Frase,

Comparative Criminal Justice As a Guide to American Law Reform: How Do the
FrenchDo It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?,78 CAL. L. REV. 539,
580 (1990). For a description of the Indian system, see Susan C. Lushing,

ComparativeCriminal Justice-Searchand Seizure, Interrogation,and Identification
of Suspects in India: A Research Note, 10 J. CRIM. JUST. 239, 240-42 (1982).
67. See Lushing, supra note 66, at 242.
68. See WILLIAM A. GELLER ET AL., A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
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taping searches, seizures, and undercover operations is more
difficult technologically, but not impossible, as has been demonstrated in situations involving car stops, street searches, and
stings.6 9
While this film verite would go far toward inhibiting testilying, it is expensive, subject to tampering, and prone to practical
devilments, like deciding when the tape must be turned on and
off. It also might unnecessarily endanger undercover police.
Furthermore, in the case of searches and seizures, and perhaps
undercover operations as well, it could result in a more serious
privacy invasion than is occasioned through mere police observation.
A separate question is how, assuming that technological (or
human) observation is feasible, the police could be forced to use
it. One argument, which I think plausible but which has been
nascent since United States v. Wade,7 ° is that the Confrontation
Clause entitles a defendant to a taping of all critical investigative
events. As Justice Brennan argued in Wade (in connection with
lineup identifications),7 ' unless the defense attorney, in person or
via a meaningful substitute, is allowed to observe the police
action in question, he is significantly hobbled in reconstructing
what happened; usually his only resource is his client, and the
judge and jury are unlikely to believe a criminal suspect in a
swearing match with the police. However, the constitutional
argument for videotaping is unlikely to be accepted by the courts

JUSTICE, POLICE VIDEOTAPING OF SUSPECT INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS: A

PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF ISSUES AND PRACTICES 54 tbl. 1 (1992) (As of 1991,

approximately one-sixth of all police and sheriffs' departments videotaped
confessions, although in many jurisdictions it was at the interrogating detective's
discretion.).
69. See Jeff Collins, New Technology Can Turn Officers into Walking Lenses,
Recording Contacts for Their and the Public's Safety, ORANGE COUNTY REG. May 8,
1995, at B1; Lan Nguyen, CamerasRoll with Patrol Cars: Video Rides Shotgun on
Arlington Streets, WASH. POST, July 6, 1995, at B1 (describing video cameras that
attach to the windshield and contain tape that cannot be erased). See generally GARY
T. MARX, UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 55-56 (1988) (describing
use of videotape in undercover operations).
70. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
71. Id. at 235 ("Insofar as the accused's conviction may rest on a courtroom
identification in fact the fruit of a suspect pretrial identification which the accused
is helpless to subject to effective scrutiny at trial, the accused is deprived of that right
of cross-examination which is an essential safeguard to his right to confront the
witnesses against him.").
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in light of developments since Wade.7" Thus, any impetus for
human or technological monitoring of the police will have to come
from elsewhere.
E.

Subjecting Police Witnesses to Lie Detection

Professor Donald Dripps has offered a proposal that he
believes might provide just such an impetus, relying on another
technological innovation-the polygraph." Dripps proposes that
if, at the conclusion of a suppression hearing, the court determines that its outcome depends upon a credibility assessment of
the police and the defendant, it should be authorized to request
that the parties supplement the record with a polygraph examination. The judge would not be bound by the results of these
examinations, but in an appropriate case (i.e., where the tests
indicate that one party was lying and the other telling the truth),
he could give them dispositive weight.7 4 To the argument that
polygraph examinations are insufficiently reliable as indicators
of veracity, Dripps points out the low likelihood that two polygraph examinations (i.e., the defendant's and the officer's) would
be wrong.75
Dripps hopes that the possibility of such a polygraph battle
will lead the police to adopt corroboration methods such as
videotaping of interrogations.7 6 Presumably they will do so,
however, only if the polygraph tests could be wrong. If, as Dripps
argues, polygraphs are accurate, then truthful officers have no
incentive to provide such corroboration, and of course lying
officers will try to manufacture it. Nonetheless, Dripps is

72. In United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973), the Supreme Court appeared

to reject the "critical stage" analysis of Wade and adopted a "trial-like confrontation"
analysis, which contemplates application of the Sixth Amendment only to those

stages of the criminal process in which the "intricacies of the law and the advocacy
of the public prosecutor are involved." Id. at 309; see also CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD
& CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND
CONCEPTS § 31.03(a) (1993).
73. Donald A. Dripps, Police, Plus Perjury, Equals Polygraphy (in press,

manuscript on file with author).
74. Id. at 1.
75. Id. at 27.

76. Id. at 35. ("[A] rule of admissibility [of polygraph results] would create
incentives for the police to actively prevent, rather than actively encourage, swearing
contests.").

1054

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

probably right that the threat of a polygraph exam will at least
77
encourage police to "tell straighter stories to the prosecution.
The primary problem with Dripps's proposal is not that it
won't reduce police lying (I think it will), and not that it won't
increase attempts at corroboration (I do not know whether it will
or not), but that it undermines what this article has assumed to
be the primary reason for fighting testilying: the belief that to
have an effective police force and law enforcement system we
need to trust the police. Hooking police men and women up to
machines undermines that trust; it tells the public that the
credibility of officers of the law needs to be tested like that of
criminal suspects, suspected traitors, and job applicants. As with
some of the other proposals discussed above, I think Dripps's idea
may be worth trying, either alone or in combination with one or
more of the others. But if there were an appropriate way to get
police to tell the truth without such a trust-busting "techno-fix,"
I would prefer it.
III.

REDUCING THE PRESSURE TO LIE AND TO IGNORE LYING

As this article has suggested, the pressure to lie comes at the
police from all sides. Peers routinely engage in deceit, supervisors stress quotas, and the public wants criminals behind bars
without having to hear too much about how they got there. The
criminals themselves lie all the time, and the police naturally
enough would prefer to see them incarcerated rather than out on
the street two weeks after they are arrested. The impetus to lie
is so great that the police will probably always find a counter to
deterrence-driven solutions-whether it is more lying, tampering
with videotape, or practicing how to beat a lie detector. A
preferable way of dealing with testilying is to reduce the pressure
to commit it. Simultaneously, one could increase incentives for
prosecutors and judges to do something about the perjury that
does occur, which should also have the effect of assuring greater
compliance with substantive constitutional law as police realize
they cannot cover up their illegal actions. Below I suggest three
proposals designed to accomplish these goals.

77. Id. at 28.
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Punishmentsand Rewards

Deterrence of testilying in the face of the intense pressure to
lie requires stiff punishment: a perjury conviction and dismissal
from the force.7" For the reasons given above, however, punishment alone, even if routinely applied, will not change police
behavior in this regard; indeed, it may well reinforce the "usagainst-them" attitude that encourages further deceit. As Albert
Quick has argued,7 9 police need positive reinforcement for the
type of conduct we think is appropriate.
Thus, officers who provide corroboration of their testimony,
whether through panchas,videotape, or some other mechanism,
should be commended and promoted for their efforts. Officers
who expose police perjury should also be singled out for favorable
treatment (although it cannot be denied that the rewards would
have to be significant to break the code of silence followed by the
police)."0 The essential point is that the sensitivity training
alluded to earlier is not enough. A society concerned about
testilying must put its money where its mouth is.
B. Flexifying Probable Cause
Police lying is not always a calculated assault on our Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights. For instance, at the time
they engage in a search or a seizure police usually believe, in good
faith, that they have the goods on the suspect. But when they
truthfully explain themselves to a judge, they often find that their
suspicion, based on experience and gut feeling, was an unconstitutional "hunch." Consider what an officer told Jerome Skolnick,
after both he and Skolnick saw a person the cop knew to be an
addict turn away from him with his left fist closed:

78. One could add to these two punishments liability in damages but, at the
federal level at least, this would require reversal of Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325
(1983).
79. Albert T. Quick, AttitudinalAspects of Police Compliancewith Procedural
Due Process, 6 AM. J. CRIM. L. 25, 48-54 (1978) (describing various methods of
reinforcing police conformance with due process norms (e.g., promotions, bonuses,
praise), an approach that is claimed to change attitudes and thus help establish the
desired patterns of behavior).
80. Cf. PUNCH, supra note 8, at 155 (describing how police "operate by a code of
silence which dictates that you do not 'rat on your mates' ").
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It's awfully ,hard to explain to a judge what I mean when I
testify that I saw a furtive movement. I'm glad you were along
to see this because you can see what we're up against.... I can
testify as to the character of the neighborhood, my knowledge
that the man was an addict and all that stuff, but what I mean
is that when I see a hype move the way that guy moved, I know
he's trying to get rid of something.8 '
The officer felt that he had enough evidence to search the man's
hand, but also believed, according to Skolnick rightly so, that he
did not have probable cause as that term is defined by the courts.
In such a situation, elaboration of the facts, perhaps adding that
the person tried to run away, or that the drug was in plain view,
is a natural reaction on the part of a police officer. Professor
Uviller calls this type of perjury an "instrumental adjustment, [a]
slight alteration in the facts to accommodate an unwieldy
constitutional constraint and obtain a just result." 2
At least one constitutional constraint-probable cause
-should not be so unwieldy. We need to take seriously the
Supreme Court's injunction that probable cause is a "common
sense" concept which should incorporate the experience of the
officer."3 Contrary to what courts have said, for instance,
observation of a stranger to the neighborhood trying to hitch a
ride with his shirt draped over a TV and wool gloves in his back
pocket, an hour after he was seen peering into two houses, should
be sufficient to authorize a search; 4 so should possession of
reliable information that a person sold drugs five months earlier,
when combined with recent police observation of people routinely
leaving his house with small packages.88

81. SKOLNICK, supranote 24, at 216.
82. UVILLER, supra note 20, at 115-16.
83. See, e.g., United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) (Probable cause
"does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities [and] common-sense
conclusions about human behavior ....[T]he evidence thus collected must be seen
and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those
versed in the field of law enforcement."); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)
(after quoting the above passage in Cortez, stating that "probable cause is a fluid
concept-turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual
contexts-not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules").
84. People v. Quintero, 657 P.2d 948 (Colo. 1983) (no probable cause on these
facts).
85. These are essentially the facts of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984),
in which the suppression hearing judge ruled that probable cause did not exist. Id.
at 903 n.2.
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Further, as I have argued elsewhere," probable cause to
search should not be conceptualized as a fixed quantity of
certainty but rather, as is already the case with suspicion
requirements associated with seizures, 7 should be varied
according to the level of intrusion involved. This "proportionality"
approach, which can be reconciled with both the language and the
history of the Fourth Amendment,8 8 has several advantages.89
The most important advantage for present purposes is the
flexibility it gives the police. For instance, under this approach
and the definition of probable cause urged above, the heavily
criticized entry of Simpson's compound would be viewed in a
different light: based on their knowledge of Simpson's history
and the inability to reach him at his home, the police may well
have had enough cause to search his curtilage-if not his
house-even if the Bronco had had no blood stains on it."
The danger in "flexifying" probable cause, of course, is the
extra discretion it gives police. But if this flexibility is coupled
with a stringent warrant requirement,9 1 police discretion may not
be appreciably expanded. In the meantime, this flexibility will
reduce the occasions in which police need to make "instrumental
adjustments" while under oath, whether in a warrant proceeding,
a suppression hearing or, as discussed below, a damages suit.
C. Changingthe Remedy
The final and most controversial suggestion for minimizing
testilying is to abolish the exclusionary rule. While the first two
proposals attempt to accommodate the police by trying to siphon

86. Slobogin, supra note 63, at 68-75.
87. Cf. Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (minimal intrusion of state sobriety
checkpoint program held reasonable when balanced against substantial state interest
in highway safety); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (pat-down of outer clothing to
search for weapons justified by circumstances).
88. Slobogin, supra note 63, at 75-78 (noting that the term "probable cause" had
no clear meaning as an historical matter and thus can constitutionally be defined as
"that cause which makes probable the reasonableness of the intrusion occasioned by
a given search or seizure").
89. For example, it allows the amendment greater scope than current law
because it avoids imposing a "more-likely-than-not" certainty requirement every time
a police action is labeled a search. Id. at 77.
90. However, I would have required a warrant in this situation given the time
elapsed between the initial investigation of the murder scene and the entry of the
compound. See id. at 32; Cloud, supra note 52, at 1346-47.
91. See Slobogin, supra note 63, at 29-33, 75.
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off the pressure to lie, this proposal is meant to change the
behavior of prosecutors and judges by reducing the urge to wink
at such lying. As Orfield and others have observed firsthand, for
people in the latter positions, "instrumental adjustments" by
police hoping to convict guilty people are very hard to fault, much
less prosecute and punish, when the result is the dismissal of
worthy charges. If the rule were abolished, on the other hand,
prosecutors would be more willing to expose and prosecute such
perjury, and judges more willing to conclude that it occurred,
especially if, as suggested above, a successful perjury prosecution
meant the prosecutor and judge would never have to work with
the officer again.
Further, abolition of the exclusionary rule does not have to
mean the Constitution will become a dead letter. A liquidated
damages remedy, such as the one proposed by Professor Robert
Davidow,92 may well provide a more than adequate substitute.
Davidow would authorize a government ombudsman to receive
and investigate complaints against the police and to assign
private counsel to sue the individual officer and the government
in front of a judge. The officer found in bad-faith violation of the
Constitution would be liable for a certain percentage of his salary,
while the government would pay an equivalent sum for good-faith
violations. Because such a system makes the officer liable for
unreasonable mistakes, it is clearly a better individualdeterrent
than the rule, which is not very effective in this regard.93 Because
it holds the department liable for reasonable mistakes of law
made by its officers, this type of damages action also provides a
strong incentive for training programs, and thus would probably
not diminish the institutional compliance that is the one proven
effect of the exclusionary rule.94

92. Robert P. Davidow, CriminalProcedureOmbudsman Revisited, 73 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 939 (1982).

93. See, e.g., Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and
Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 720-31 (1970) (pointing out, inter alia, that the
primary effect of the rule is visited on the prosecutor rather than the police officer).
Indeed, a damages remedy could over-deter. See Milton A. Loewenthal, Evaluating
the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 49 UMKC L. REV. 24, 31-32 (1980). The
good-faith exception in the Davidow proposal should minimize that problem.
Furthermore, of course, the latter remedy avoids the damage to the credibility of the
criminal justice system caused when exclusion allows a criminal to be released on a
"technicality."
94. See Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a
"PrincipledBasis"Rather Than an "EmpiricalProposition'?,16 CREIGHTON L. REV.
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Of course, the fact that a damages action directly affects the
officer's wallet might produce even more incentive than the
exclusionary rule to dissemble about illegal investigative actions.
The three-part proposal described above should nonetheless
reduce testilying because it will reduce the illegal activity that
spawns such fabrication. Positive reinforcement of truth-telling
should produce more witnesses willing to contradict a lying
officer, who will thus have greater incentive to avoid any action
that necessitates a cover-up. Construing probable cause in a
flexible manner will of course directly diminish the number of
"illegal" police actions. Finally, the more realistic threat of
perjury charges, brought by prosecutors who no longer fear losing
their case as a result, should work to reduce violations of the
Constitution as officers become less certain their malfeasance and
subsequent lies about it will remain unchallenged.
CONCLUSION

Police, like people generally, lie in all sorts of contexts for all
sorts of reasons.9 5 This article has focused on police lying
designed to convict individuals the police think are guilty. Strong
measures are needed to reduce the powerful incentives to practice
such testilying and the reluctance of prosecutors and judges to do
anything about it. Among them might be the adoption of rewards
for truth telling, the redefinition of probable cause, and the
elimination of the exclusionary rule and its insidious effect on the
resolve of legal actors to implement the commands of the Constitution.
Ultimately, however, the various proposals set forth in this
article are merely suggestive, meant to stimulate debate about
how to curtail testilying at suppression hearings.9 6 There is
565, 590-91 (1983). An ombudsman system could also facilitate detection of patterns
of misbehavior and particular miscreant officers, something which is not easily
accomplished under an exclusionary rule regime relying on individual attorneys.
95. For a treatment of other types of police lies, see Christopher Slobogin,
Investigative Lies by the Police (in preparation). See also Tom Barker & David
Carter, Fluffing Up the Evidence and Covering Your Ass: Some ConceptualNotes on
Police Lying, 11 DEvIANT BEHAv. 61, 62-67 (1990).
96. Cf. Kevin R. Reitz, Testilying As a Problem of Crime Control: A Reply to
Professor Slobogin, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1061 (1996). My only quibble with Professor
Reitz's criticisms of my proposals is that I think he underestimates the impact of
flexifying probable cause and overestimates the impact of substituting a damages
remedy for the exclusionary rule.
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strong evidence to suggest that police in many jurisdictions
routinely engage in this kind of deceit, and that prosecutors and
judges are sometimes accomplices to it. Even if it turns out that
this evidence exaggerates the problem,17 the fact remains that,
because of the O.J. Simpson trial and similar events, more people
than ever before believe it exists. To restore trust in the police
and the criminal justice system, we need to take meaningful steps
against testilying now.

97.

See id. at 1062-65.

